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Towards an Economics of Convention-Based Approach 
of the European Competition Policy 
Frédéric Marty ∗ 
Abstract: »Für einen konventionenbasierten Ansatz der europäischen Wett-
bewerbspolitik«. The article aims at developing an analysis of the European 
competition law enforcement dynamics based on the framework of economics 
of convention. The article questions the ordoliberal theoretical foundations of 
the EU competition policy and it assesses to what extent the implementation of 
a more economic approach might pertain to a convention based on Chicago 
School normative views. The economic history, the history of economics 
thought, and the legal history are scrutinized when the European court’s case 
law is considered as the main driving force of conventional shifts in matter of 
competition law enforcement. 
Keywords: Competition policy, abuse of dominant position, ordoliberalism, Chi-
cago School, competition law, economics of convention, State as convention. 
1.  Introduction1 
The European Commission enforcement policy (European Commission 2005, 
2009) may mark a process of convergence toward a new political logic in 
which economic efficiency (e.g. utility maximization) is considered as the sole 
purpose of competition policy and consumer welfare as the sole admissible 
criterion for judges’ decisions. However, this Chicagoan influence clashes with 
the traditional theoretical foundations of the European competition policy 
(Warzoulet 2010). This effects-based approach sharply differs from an ordoliber-
al conception, according to which the economic freedom of market actors consti-
tutes the aim of the policy (Akman 2013). In other words, the first conception is 
focused on the defense of the market process in itself and for itself, while the 
second is polarized in its outcome. The first approach conceives the competition 
in agonistic terms. Therefore, protecting competition supposes to keep balancing 
an unsteady form of market characterized by an effective rivalry between com-
petitors, a view that sharply contrasts with Chicagoan one.  
                                                             
∗  Frédéric Marty, University Nice Sophia Antipolis, Research Group on Law, Economics and 
Management, UMR CNRS 7321 Gredeg, France; Frederic.marty@gredeg.cnrs.fr. 
1  The author wishes to thanks Patrice Bougette and Marc Deschamps for helpful comments 
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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The economization of competition law enforcement might be an all but neu-
tral device. We propose, in our contribution, a key to understanding these con-
troversies in terms of competing conventions on competition policy.  
Our approach is based on the economics of convention and especially on the 
concept of convention of the State, developed by Storper and Salais (1997). We 
propose to extrapolate these ones on the competition policy domain. A conven-
tion of competition might be defined as the common consensus or pattern of 
expectations about the public enforcement of competition laws, or as the shared 
interpersonal views about what the core purpose of the competition policy is. 
We aim at highlighting the plurality of such conventions and to lay the 
groundwork for an analysis of their historical dynamics. Our purpose is to 
explain why only evolutions in the interpretation of the Treaty by the Court of 
Justice (in short CJ) may set the wheels of a conventional shift in motion. We 
consider that the judicial decision is – from a Weberian perspective – a “reality 
test,” through which the competition convention, defined as the articulation of 
a plurality of possible worlds of law (Didry 2002, 33), comes out and becomes 
the basis of the stakeholders’ expectations. 
The CJ case law has crystallized a very specific conception of the competition 
process. Our purpose in this contribution is to investigate its origin and to ques-
tion the theoretical economic and political paradigm that underlies the current 
convention of competition policy. The question is all the more important that the 
current European case law sends conflicting signal, with the CJ Post Danmark 
judgment (2012) that seems to make a step towards a conciliation between the 
Commission views and its traditional decisional practice; the General Court (GC) 
Intel judgment (2014) that appears to confirm the traditional case law. 
We propose to elaborate a reading template of the plurality and the dynam-
ics of such conventions by combining two dimensions. The first dimension 
deals with government attitude towards the market process and can present three 
distinct modalities: a laissez-faire approach, a definition of the rules of the games, 
or direct interventionism. The second dimension holds to its objective regarding 
the market process. Its main concern might be the equal opportunity to access the 
market, the fairness of the distribution of wealth or economic power, or welfare 
maximization. The crossings of these variables define several conventions of 
competition that we propose to characterize by confronting the European case 
law, economic history, and the history of economic thought. 
This article analyzes the dynamics of the conventions of competition within 
the European context. The first section presents the possible convention of 
competition. The second section, we propose to define what would be an 
ordoliberal convention of competition by highlighting the very specific issue of 
private economic powers. The third section questions the decisional practice of 
EU institutions in the light with these conventions and defines what the con-
vention adopted by the EU would have been since the late sixties. The fourth 
section presents how this convention is challenged by Chicago-influenced 
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economic and legal scholars, and to what extent their views, which constitute 
an alternative convention, are endorsed by the Commission. Finally, the fifth 
section considers the plausibility of a reversal of the CJ jurisprudence that may 
initiate a conventional shift. 
2.   The Conventions of Competition Policy 
We define conventions as “shared interpersonal logics how to coordinate and to 
evaluate actions, individuals and objects in situations of uncertainty” (Diaz-
Bone 2011, 46). In a context in which a plurality of possible rationalities might 
be implemented, “conventions are socio-cultural resources for the coordination 
between actors” (Diaz-Bone 2011, 46). A convention may be useful to coordi-
nate and to evaluate action, but to form some patterns of expectations about 
public policies as well.  
Within the “économie des conventions” theoretical field, we mobilize the 
concept of conventions of the State, as first defined by Storper and Salais 
(1997). Such conventions describe the shared expectations about government 
interventions. Storper and Salais distinguish between three conventions. The 
first one is the convention of the “external” State. Government intervention is 
not only expected by economic actors, but this one will also take place in a 
very specific position: outside and above the action itself. Government is there-
fore viewed as a general interest-minded actor, all-powerful, all-knowing and 
benevolent according to the model of traditional public economics. The second 
convention is the “convention of the absent State.” Economic operators do not 
expect an external intervention, and the government itself acts in order to min-
imize its interferences with economic transactions among private sector enti-
ties. Liberalization policies and the recommendations of the new public eco-
nomics make sense within such logic. The last convention is the one of the 
“situated State” in which government interacts with private entities on equal 
terms. Government is neither superior nor absent. This view corresponds to the 
concept of the subsidiary State. The government intervenes only if necessary to 
support the collective interaction without imposing its own preferences. 
The concept of “conventions of regulation” was implemented to analyze the 
liberalization dynamics of network industries (Marty 2006). The transition 
from a legal monopoly regime to competition was analyzed through the deci-
sional practice of the French competition authority. Legal resources of action 
provided by the European competition law and the liberalization directives are 
mobilized by the stakeholders in order to accelerate the conventional change. A 
same method can be applied to competition policy. 
We do not consider institutions, and particularly legal rules, as external con-
straints for economic actors or mechanical devices that apply without uncertainty 
and in a constant way (as the economic analysis of law too often assumes). We 
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assume that the sense of a rule and its capacity to shape stakeholders’ expecta-
tions cannot be defined outside and before its interpretation through a judicial 
(or a controversial) decision. We consequently adopt a Weberian perspective 
(Raveaud 2008). Institutions cannot be considered as exogenous factors for the 
stakeholders but endogenous: “institutions are conceived as enacted by actors and 
the meaning of these institutions for actors is reconstructed. Economic actors 
contribute to the interpretative process and to the following enactment of the 
performative reality of institutions” (Diaz-Bone 2011, 55). 
The choice of this method is coherent with our definition of conventions and 
our view about their dynamics. We see them both in terms of a social consen-
sus about the expectations on government interventions or judge rulings, but 
also in terms of equilibrium among conflicting social interests. We do not con-
sider rules as mechanical devices that apply without uncertainty and in a constant 
way (as the economic analysis of law too often assumes). The law has to be in-
terpreted by judges through its activation in judicial conflicts. In the competition 
law field, as many others, their rulings are based on precedents, but they are not 
determined by them, as it could be the case under a stare-decisis framework. The 
balances conflicting interests and interprets in situations what would be both 
the legislator intent and the current collective expectations. 
According to us, the jurisprudence case law embodies a kind of crystalliza-
tion of conventions and its evolution conveys their dynamics. We follow the 
path of Oliver Wendell Holmes in its first Lowell Lecture delivered on Novem-
ber 23, 1880; the evolution of law can be explained by:  
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessi-
ties of the time, and the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in de-
termining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the 
story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt 
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. 
Our purpose in this article is to apply this model to competition policy or, even 
more precisely, to the enforcement of competition law. Our analysis is mainly 
based on the decisional practice of the European Union institutions in charge of 
the implementation of competition policy, e.g. the Commission and the Euro-
pean courts of Luxembourg. We try to describe how conventions of competi-
tion “inscrib[e] general principles of justice” (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011, 14) 
within the competition policy field, and shape patterns of expectations of the 
economic actors on the interpretation of competition law provisions. We also 
strive to analyze the process by which such conventions may evolve in the 
environment of a predominantly judge-made law. In this sense, we try to an-
swer to one of the research questions opened by the German Historical School 
of economics about institutions, e.g. “when and why do the institutional ar-
rangements of a society change?” (Kocka 2010, 50). 
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We propose to distinguish between different possible conventional fields in 
matters of competition policy through two dimensions. The first one is defined 
by the possible attitudes of government towards the market process and a sec-
ond one defines the objectives assigned to the competition policy. 
The models of intervention take three different forms. The first one corre-
sponds to a laissez-faire approach. The second lies on an intervention aiming at 
defining the rules of the game in order to maintain a free and an undistorted 
competition and to provide guarantees against the concentration of economic 
power. The third is a direct intervention on the economic process in order to 
implement governmental objectives.  
The second dimension deals with the objectives of competition policy and, 
to some extent, with the expectations about the result of the competition pro-
cess. The first objective consists of ensuring equal opportunities for all eco-
nomic actors, for example in terms of market access. The second one deals 
with justice concerns. Among the objectives of the competition policy, the 
fairness of the distribution is taken into account. The role of the competition 
law might be also conceived in terms of re-equilibration of economic powers 
(see, for example, the notion of abuse of economic dependence situation). This 
objective is more far reaching than the first one. Removing barriers to entry do 
not longer appear as sufficient. The objectives of the competition policy may be 
defined in terms of market structure or of dispersal of economic power. The last 
modality is certainly the more obvious: the purpose assigned of the economic 
process (and of the economic policy as a whole) is to maximize the social or the 
consumer welfare. 
Crossing these different modalities lead to define several conventions of 
competition. 
The intersection of a laissez-faire policy and a welfare maximization objec-
tive defines a manchesterian convention of competition. This is closely linked 
to the convention of the absent State. We have to note that an Austrian eco-
nomics-based view of competition policy might be linked to this configuration. 
Contract law and civil law provisions might be considered as sufficient to pro-
tect the market process. No specific set of rules and no dedicated government 
interventions are needed according to this theoretical perspective.  
On the contrary, if we still consider the welfare maximization as the main 
purpose, and if we admit an intervention on the market process, we might be 
close to the logic of a planning system. If the purpose is to obtain a given in-
dustrial structure or to reach a given distribution within the society, the conven-
tion at stake echoes back to industrial policy logic. Within this convention, the 
government is not an impartial arbiter or a regulator, but an active and domi-
nant player that defines collective priorities (Warzoulet 2008). The convention 
of the external State underlies this logic.  
A last configuration, in which a direct intervention on market process result 
might be envisaged, corresponds to an objective in terms of freedom to access 
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or in terms of undistorted competition. It may be representative of the current 
European competition policy. The competition enforcement may go as far as 
counteracting the result of the market process and support an economic actor in 
order to protect a given structure of competition. The competition policy might 
lead to an asymmetric regulation of competition to the detriment of the domi-
nant undertaking. As we will see, an ordoliberal convention might be quite 
different as government intervention is rather limited to edict general rules and 
to guarantee an undistorted access to the market.  
The last conventional scheme can be obtained by crossing an intervention on 
the rules of the game, and a focus on the sole welfare dimension. This conven-
tion undoubtedly echoes back the case of the Second Chicago School of Anti-
trust. It differs from its predecessor, the First Chicago School, mainly by its 
lack of concern about distributional issues and its polarization on the consumer 
welfare maximization (Van Horn 2010). Indeed the Second Chicago School 
considers that the market behavior of a dominant undertaking, even a monopo-
list, has only to be sanctioned in very specific situations (Van Horn 2009).  
As we have already noted, the Second Chicago School has evolved towards a 
more laissez-faire approach over time, becoming more and more skeptical about 
competition laws. Chicagoan scholars increasingly advocate for an antitrust 
modesty (Crane 2007) and to renew with a very conservative view of competition 
law enforcement bordering on Austrian views or classical laissez-faire.  
We propose to present in our next sections these different conventions (pre-
sented in the table infra) and to formulate hypothesis about the EU competition 
trajectory across them by putting the accent on the role of the jurisprudence. 
Table 1:  Conventions of Competition 
 
Government attitudes towards the market process 
Laissez-faire Regulating the competition 
Direct  
interventionism 
Government 
main objective 
Equal opportuni-
ties to access the 
market 
 Ordoliberal convention 
European integra-
tionist convention 
Distributional 
concerns  
Old Chicago 
School 
Colbertian indus-
trial policy 
External State 
convention 
Efficiency 
Laissez-faire 
convention 
Second Chicago 
School (current) 
and Austrian 
School) 
Absent State 
convention 
Effects-based 
approach 
convention 
Second Chicago 
School (original) 
Planning system 
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3.  The Principles of an Ordoliberal Convention of 
Competition 
Our purpose, in this third section, is to highlight the constitutive principles of 
an “ordoliberal” convention of competition policy. We aim also at establishing 
its intellectual connection with the First Chicago School. We first adopt a histo-
ry of economic thought perspective (3.1) before analyzing the recommenda-
tions of this convention, in order to confront it, in our next section, with the 
European institutions decisional practice (3.2). 
3.1  A Neoliberal View of Competition Policy 
The Manchesterian tradition of economic liberalism advocates laissez-faire. 
From this perspective, competition policy, if necessary, has to sanction only the 
operators that have infringed market rules. Even more, Austrian economics 
tradition scholars consider that competition laws themselves are unnecessary 
and potentially harmful. The ordoliberal tradition and the First Chicago School 
diverge from such views. The experiences of the failure of the first German law 
in 1923 during the Weimar Republic (Gerber 1998) and of the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s convinced many scholars that the old-fashioned liberalism 
has to be reformed. Markets no longer appeared self-regulated. Competition 
was no longer seen as a natural process. The concentration of economic power, 
stemming from the competition process, was seen as a threat not only for the 
competition process itself but also for economic and political liberties. 
We may easily connect the ordoliberal convention in late 1930s neo-
liberalism, especially with the views expressed during the Colloque Walter Lipp-
mann in 1938. This common root explains the coherence between the ordoliberal 
conceptions and the First Chicago School ones (Van Horn 2009). 
Indeed, in the late 1930s, the first Chicago School took very aggressive posi-
tions in matters of antitrust laws enforcement, putting down the use of the rule 
of reason to the profit to formal rules, and disapproving the acquisition of sub-
stantial market power “regardless of how reasonably that power may appear to 
be exercised” (Simons 1934, 58). The School and its figurehead, Henry Si-
mons, started to consider the large undertakings and the subsequent concentra-
tion of market power as a threat for the competition process and political liber-
ties. The dispersal of economic power, and not the economic efficiency, was 
considered to be the main purpose of antitrust. According to Simons (1948, 
43): “the great enemy of democracy is monopoly in all its forms.” In the late 
1930s, the Chicagoans supported antitrust enforcement as a tool to thwart 
against the concentration of economic power.  
Simons has gone as far as envisaging clear-cut solutions to solve this issue, 
such as dismantling monopolies or bringing antitrust suits against any firm who 
acquire a monopoly position, even on its own merits. In this sense, the norma-
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tive views of Simons were coherent with the ones expressed by Judge Learned 
Hand in his emblematic ruling in the Alcoa case, recommending that antitrust 
laws prevent the dominance of an industry by a sole undertaking. If we consid-
er our table, such a convention may be located at the intersection of a concern 
about a fair distribution of market power and a judicial activism aiming at 
protecting the market process. 
3.2  An Essay of Definition of an Ordoliberal Convention of 
Competition 
This “old Chicago School” convention is closely interlinked with the ordoliber-
al one (Köhler and Kolev 2011). The Simons’ positive program for neoliberal-
ism and the ordoliberal convention shared the same views about the necessity 
of relying on a “strong State” to implement the rule of law in order to ensure 
the sustainability of the competitive process. However, the tensions that arose 
during the Colloque Walter Lippmann between von Mises and Rüstow have 
prefigured the dividing lines within the Mont Pèlerin Society between Chica-
goans and ordoliberals (Denord, 2008). Two neoliberal views draw into con-
flict: an “unstrained laissez faire” and a “laissez faire within rules” (Kolev et al. 
2014). In the first Mont Pèlerin Society conference, Eucken, following Simons’ 
legacy, advocated for a positive competition policy aiming at establishing and 
preserving the rules of game.  
According to Simons, the intervention had to be oriented towards these rules 
(the economic order) and not towards the moves of the game e.g. the economic 
process. However, his focus on economic freedom constitutes one of the stum-
bling blocks with the future promoters of the Second Chicago School. The first 
objective of an ordoliberal convention is to allow economic actors to benefit 
from an undistorted access to the market. The welfare is seen as a by-product 
of economic liberty, a result of the market process and not the objective of the 
competition policy. 
Government intervention, and especially a strong defense of the rule of law, 
is nonetheless essential to safeguard competition. The reason is chiefly that 
competition is not viewed as a spontaneous order but a construct one. In addi-
tion, competition produces its effects only if its structure is uncorrupted. If the 
ordoliberal principles lead to the banning of any government intervention with-
in the market process in order to achieve a given purpose, its actions that must 
pertain to an indirect regulation (an Ordnungspolitik) have to preserve competi-
tion order and be strong enough to prevent powerful economic entities from 
abusing from their coercive powers against smaller competitors or consumers. 
Whatever its origins, public or private, the concentration of economic pow-
ers is analyzed as a threat to economic liberties. As a consequence, competition 
policy has to thwart such a concentration or, if it is not possible, to forbid dom-
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inant firms to use their market power. If “unavoidable monopolies” have to be 
tolerated, they must be regulated by an independent agency. 
According to the ordoliberals, a dominant firm has to be sanctioned only if it 
uses coercive powers against its competitors. In this sense, their views differ 
from those of Structural School of Harvard’s ones that led to sanction the dom-
inant position per se, whatever the dominant undertaking’s conduct was. It is 
possible to establish a link between this view and the concept of special re-
sponsibility of the dominant firm, stemming from the CJ case law, with the “as 
if” requirement. Within this framework, the competition authority has to sanc-
tion any market behavior of a dominant firm that tends to impair its competi-
tors access to market (Behinderungswettbewerb). Any practice resulting in 
putting a competitor at a disadvantage even if it would be profitable for the 
dominant firm might be seen as anticompetitive in this convention. 
To conclude, the ordoliberal convention differs from the industrial policy 
one as it refuses to intervene directly within the market sphere in order to correct 
the market outcome or to orientate it towards a collectively preferable allocation. 
However, it also differs from the laissez-faire one as the government has to play 
as a market regulator that defines the rules of the game and sanctions any attempt 
to the competitive order (Wettbewerbsordnung). In addition, if access to the 
market is undoubtedly the main concern in such an ordoliberal view, it remains 
that, to some extent, some ordoliberal scholars promote an objective of substan-
tial equality of economic powers. So if in Table 1 (above), the position of the 
ordoliberal position is undoubtedly within the second column, it also might be 
at the second line (distributional concerns) not mandatory only at the first (level 
playing field). Anyway, according to ordoliberals, the consumer welfare maxi-
mization cannot be the sole purpose of competition policy (Giocoli 2012). 
4.  The European Courts Case Law: Building an Ordoliberal 
Convention of Competition? 
In this section, our purpose consists of assessing the ordoliberal influence in the 
definition of European competition policy in its early years (4.1) and in pre-
senting the teleological convention built by the European courts (4.2). 
4.1  Searching for the Ordoliberal Soul of Article 102 EU 
If the Ordoliberal School had a significant influence on the 1957 German law 
against restraints of competition (Gesetz gegen Wettwerbsbeschränkungen, 
GWB), its mark on European competition policy provisions was indirect and 
imperfect. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome was a compromise between divergent 
views, both about the role of competition policy and about its enforcement 
modalities. The primacy of competition policy concerns was challenged by the 
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French and the Italian, more favorable of an industrial policy-based European 
model. Even if some eminent members of the German delegation involved in 
the preparation of the Treaty were influenced by ordoliberal views on competi-
tion,2 the Treaty did not ban cartels and seems to be deceptive with respect to 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) model, and especially to its 
High Authority in charge of antitrust responsibilities (Warlouzet 2010). In 
addition, the vertical balance of powers was not clear. The enforcement by the 
Commission might have been challenged. 
As Akman (2009) states: “Article 82EC3 was not perceived as a fully en-
forceable provision as such.” This surely explains why, for many years, it was 
feared that Article 82EC would remain a ‘dead letter.’” Nevertheless, the inter-
pretation of the article opened the door for a first attempt to increase the power of 
ordoliberal influence. This one was favored by the activism of the first president 
of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, and by the one of the first Euro-
pean Commissioner to competition, Hans von der Groeben, who was one of the 
authors of the Spaak Report of April 1956. The Commission, with its Regula-
tion 17/62, attempted to give to the European competition policy construction 
an ordoliberal spirit. It attributed strong powers to the Commission but led, at 
the same time, to its harmful engorgement by making mandatory the notifica-
tion of any agreement among firms whatever their relative sizes on the market.4 
As the Member States refused to grant the Commission the powers to proceed 
through block exemptions, the situation led to a failure. The enlargement to the 
United Kingdom, with a very different legal tradition in terms of competition 
law, constituted another obstacle for the Commission “ordoliberal” activism. 
4.2  The Building of the Teleological Convention by the EU Courts 
Therefore, the core meaning of the articles devoted to competition purposes has 
emerged progressively mainly thought the CJ decisional practice, leading to 
what David Gerber (1998) named a teleological approach. The competition law 
enforcement becomes the privileged levy to construct an internal market based 
on a free and undistorted competition. 
It is necessary to draw a separating line between an ordoliberal convention, 
and the teleological convention built by the Commission and European courts 
case law. Ordoliberals do promote negative rules, favoring stakeholders’ free-
dom of choice in terms of organization within a general framework aiming at 
protecting the market process (Foucault 2004). Such conception excludes, to a 
large extent, any constructivism. However, as Robert Salais (2013, 295) under-
                                                             
2  It was, for example, the case of the deputy of Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics from 
1949 to 1963, Alfred Müller-Armack. 
3  Articles 86, 82 and 102 correspond to the successive numbering of the same article over the 
Treaty revisions. 
4  36,000 notifications for the year 1963 (Warzoulet 2008).  
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lines, the European authorities seem more compliant to the ordoliberal rhetoric 
than to its recommendations. Robert Salais (2013) sees the European project as 
a chimera resulting from the unexpected convergence of two initially very 
opposite views, the classical liberals and the upholders of plannist conceptions. 
According to this view, the European project drifts towards the planning of a 
perfect competition single market (see also Deakin and Pratten 1999). 
This hybrid between the industrial and the market worlds results from a pro-
ject to found the legitimacy of a political construction on economic liberty, as 
the ordoliberal principles did in West Germany in the late forties, according to 
Foucault (2004, 85). However, the legal rules at stake are not constituent or 
regulatory ones defining the rules of the game – Spielregeln – (see Vanberg 
2004, 6), but are outcome-oriented. 
The interpretation made of the Article 102 was significantly broader than its 
strict wording. As is also the case for the Sherman Act, it appears particularly 
difficult and consequently speculative to reconstruct the legislator(s) intent. The 
indeterminacy of the purpose and the vagueness of the wording of Article 102 
offer a large spectrum in terms of judicial interpretation. Such situation is not so 
original, because of the open texture of legal provisions, their effective meaning 
is provided by their interpretation by competent judicial courts. In other words, 
the sense of the Article 102 could not be provided by its wording, but through the 
historical sedimentation of its implementation. This is the common and complex 
production of conflicting views, interpretations, and strategies of several stake-
holders, as the Commission, who enforces this article; the dominant firm, who 
tries to promote a favorable interpretation; its competitors, who strategically use 
it as a resource for strategic action; and the European courts, who are in charge 
of the judicial control of the Commission decisions, and, in the CJ case, of the 
interpretation of the Treaty. 
Akman (2009) shows that, in the early years of Article 102, enforcement of 
the protection of the market process did not trump economic efficiency con-
cerns; the ordoliberal influence was more decisive in the CJ decisional practice 
(Lovdahl-Gormsem 2006). For instance, in 1973, Continental Can (case 6-72) 
consecrated an extension of the scope of the article 102 from the exploitative 
abuse to the exclusionary ones. As Akman (2009, 296) quotes: “as such, it led 
to Article 82EC being predominantly used for a purpose for which it was not 
designed.” This shift towards a different convention than the strictly ordoliberal 
one justifies the position of the traditional CJ case law, and testifies on the 
capacity of the judicial interpretation to initiate a shift towards a new conven-
tion of competition. 
According to Gerber (1998, 116): Continental Can can be interpreted as 
“the apotheosis of the teleological method.” Competition policy shifts from the 
sanction of the abuses of market power (e.g. a strictly ordoliberal view) to the 
limitation of the powers of dominant undertaking in order to build the internal 
market. Continental Can leads to the consideration that a merger operation may 
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lead to an abuse of market power, irrespective of any consideration about effi-
ciency effects. As Lovdahl-Gormsem (2006, 12) considers that  
[i]t can be regarded as an abuse if an undertaking holds a position so dominant 
that the objectives of the Treaty are circumvented by an alteration to the supply 
structure, which seriously endangers the consumer’s freedom of action in the 
market such a case necessarily exists if practically all competition is eliminated. 
The dominant firm may impair the competition process through its intrinsic 
market power and might be sanctioned on this basis.  
The same logic was at stake in Commercial Solvents in 1974 (case C-6-
7/73). The CJ considered that a vertically integrated group might potentially 
eliminate any competition by acquiring the capacity to impair the access to 
market to its competitors. The issue of the impact on consumer welfare was not 
raised. The CJ tends to equate restrictions of freedom to compete on an un-
distorted basis or to access the market with abuses of dominant position.  
Such an adherence to “ordoliberal” views is not contingent and produces 
long term effects, notably because of the rule of precedent, but also because of 
the strength of the integrationist perspective. In 2007, the ruling of the CG 
(named at that time the Court of First Instance) in Microsoft was read by Ahl-
born and Evans (2009) as the mark of the persisting influence of the ordoliberal 
perspective.  
To sum up, it appears that the Treaty of Rome did not embody the essential 
features of an ordoliberal convention of competition. However, the decisional 
practice of the CJ during the late 1960s and the 1970s progressively shaped a 
very specific convention of competition more ordoliberal but different than this 
ideal-type in terms of interventionism. The purpose of constructing the internal 
market leads to the thwarting of dominant undertakings market power, and con-
sequently to implement something like an asymmetric regulation of competition. 
We have to underline that such views also echo back to the US decisional 
practice before the rising of the Second Chicago School. As we have seen, 
efficiency concerns were no more predominant. As Judge Hand stated in Alcoa, 
the Sherman Act aims at preserving a situation of effective competition.  
5.  A Convention of Competition Challenged by the More 
Economic Approach 
This section deals with the differences between what might appear as two very 
different conventions of competition policy between “ordoliberals” on the one 
side, and “Chicagoans” on the other side. Their conflicting views about unilat-
eral practices treatment bringing into opposition, and European and US anti-
trust practitioners in numerous cases (Microsoft, Intel or Google) might be 
analyzed through a conventional opposition. We present the Second Chicago 
School of competition law and economics approach (5.1) before describing the 
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implementation of a more economic approach of Article 102 enforcement by 
the Commission (5.2). 
5.1  Consumer Welfare as the Sole Legitimate Purpose of 
Competition Laws: The Chicagoan Convention 
If the first Chicago School incarnated a convention closely related to the 
ordoliberal one, a dramatic theoretical evolution took place at the end of the 
Second World War. Indeed the historical origin of the backlash goes back at 
the early postwar years, to the arrival of Friedrich von Hayek in Chicago and 
the financial support of the Volker Fund that helped to launched successively 
the Free Market Study project and the Antitrust Program. The official theoreti-
cal birth of this competition law and economics school of thought might be 
dated back to the end of the Free Market Study project. It was, in fact, defini-
tively shaped by the several works engaged during the Antitrust program from 
1953 to 1957 (Van Horn 2010). The paper written in 1956 by the co-heads of 
these two programs, Aaron Director and Edward Levi, entitled Trade Regula-
tion, constituted the manifesto of the Second Chicago School of Antitrust. 
Director and Levi were particularly skeptic of the application of antitrust 
laws “to firms of less than monopoly size or to firms which acquired their size 
without combination” (1956, 284). By doing so, they move away from the 
Simons’ view and broke antitrust enforcement away from the issue of the 
(mis)use of economic power. Moreover, they make clear their skepticism of 
exclusionary abuses, especially in the case of anticompetitive leverage strategy, 
skepticism that constitutes the “hallmark” of the Second Chicago School that 
we propose to name the Chicagoan convention of competition (Baker 2013). 
The risks induced by an over-enforcement of antitrust are already pointed 
out: losing economic gains resulting from productive efficiency, and consequent-
ly harming the final consumer. It leads finally to pleading for a negative type of 
competition policy. Governmental intervention should be limited to the removal 
of restraints to trade and barriers to entry. The monopoly in itself isnot longer 
seen as a problem if it remains contestable and if it was obtained by the merits. 
5.2  The Long Walk towards a more Economic Approach of Article 
102 
This theoretical framework provides the main basis of the criticisms addressed 
to the European decisional practice since the middle of the last decade. The 
European case law is denounced as too formalistic and excessively based on 
per se rules that do not allow the net effects of the market practices on welfare 
to be correctly taken into account. The EU courts jurisprudence appears, ac-
cording to this view, as excessively unfavorable to dominant undertakings. The 
decisional practice is denounced as being too protective for small competitors 
and is criticized as insufficiently concerned by consumer interests.  
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The 2009 Communication goes halfway towards the integration of effects 
compared with the 2005 project. While consumer welfare was defined as the 
objective underlying the article 102 in 2005, limiting the quality of products or 
the scope of the offer might be sufficient to characterize an abuse of dominant 
position according to the 2009 communication. 
Moreover, the assessment of effects is not mandatory in the case of market 
practices led by former legal monopolies. Such firms have certainly not ob-
tained their positions through their merits. Nevertheless, they constitute a large 
part of the undertakings involved in the article 102 and the protection of their 
new competitors might not benefit to consumers. In the same way, an abuse 
may be characterized, even if the exclusion has not been effective because the 
damage to competition might be irreversible in sectors characterized by signifi-
cant barriers to entry.  
Impairing competition, whatever the effect, is sufficient to sanction a domi-
nant undertaking. Even if the “pure” convention of the effects-based approach 
is not and cannot be really advocated by the Commission, this “imperfect” 
economic approach challenges the CJ still dominant convention.  
5.3  The European Courts Case Law Inertia in Debates 
Even if the Commission would rally the “Chicagoan” convention, its 2009 
communication does not engage the CJ. As Akman (2013, 5) notes: “the CJEU 
is the final arbiter of EU law and the Commission’s modernized approach can 
only be valid if the CJEU […] agrees that the Commission’s interpretation 
conforms with EU law.”  
However, the CJ and GC decisional practices seem to refuse to consider the 
gains promised by such approach [HSR: such an approach] or to balance in favor 
of freedom-based considerations against utilitarian arguments. For instance, the 
effect on welfare may be not taken into account, as the cases of Microsoft (case 
T-201/04), Michelin II (T-203/1), Deutsche Telekom (T-271/03) and Wanadoo 
(T-340/03) have demonstrated. If criteria as freedom of choice, or the preserva-
tion of diversity in terms of technical trajectories, are considered as sufficient, 
they are criticized as they may lead to protect competitors at the expense of 
consumers. According to Ahlborn and Evans (2009, 16): “The policy under 
Article 82 has remained virtually unchanged over the last 40 years. The Court’s 
analytic framework is based on concepts and ideas which predate the Chicago 
and post-Chicago developments in antitrust thinking.”  
This resistance has appeared as a surprise for economists. Significantly, Oli-
ver Budzinski (2003, 14) painted the situation darkly in 2003 than it has ap-
peared since then: “ordoliberal ideas have been second most influential (next to 
adaptations of workable competition concepts) in the formation of a European 
competition policy […], although this influence seems to cease presently.” In 
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fact, the CJ is not bound to reverse its decisional practice at the instigation of 
the Commission.  
Finally, as Géradin and Petit (2010) wrote, the CJ, being after in the 1960s 
at the extension of the domain of article 102, and who gave its ordoliberal 
integrationist coloration, is now the main obstacle on the road of a more eco-
nomic approach in the Chicagoan sense. The GC decision in Tomra (case T-
155/06, September 2010), a case involving loyalty rebates, illustrates the per-
sisting influence of a formalistic approach even if the Commission had, in its 
2009 communication, opened the door to a defense on the basis of the efficien-
cy gains resulting from rebates schemes. The “old” case law e.g. the integra-
tionist convention of competition is still applied. 
6.  Conclusion 
Such attitudes lead Géradin (2010) to consider the courts of Luxembourg as 
constituting the main obstacle for a possible conventional shift by supporting 
Commission against recourses based on efficiency defense, and alternatively by 
defending, against the Commission, an ordoliberal type conception of competi-
tion policy: “the ECJ and the General Court largely supported the decisional 
practice of the Commission […] often making matters worse by adding a 
strong “ordoliberal” flavor to their judgments” (Gérardin 2010, 2). The influ-
ence of this convention is confirmed by the comprehensive review of EU 
courts’ decision performed by Akman (2013). 
However, their position cannot be considered in a too monolithic way. A re-
versal appears to be possible, particularly if we consider the CJ Post Danmark 
judgment (Post Danmark AS / Konkurrencerådet, case C-209/10, 27 March 
2012) that might be interpreted as a milestone in the evolution towards a more 
economic approach concerning price-based exclusionary practices. The CJ has 
adopted a cost criteria proposed by the Commission in its 2009 communication 
to determine if a given price practice may exclude a competitor as efficient as 
the incumbent. As the CJ underlined in Post Danmark, an exclusionary abuse 
may be characterized as soon as the dominant undertaking tends to exclude an 
as-efficient competitors on another basis than the merits (§25).  
If the purpose is to shift from a form-based approach to a more economic 
one (see Petit 2009), the “consumer welfare” test may appear as the best candi-
date considering the influence of the US practices. However, The CJ opted for 
the equally efficient operator test because it guarantees to undertake a satisfy-
ing level of legal certainty essential for allowing them to self-assess the com-
pliance of their market strategies with competition laws. In this sense, it consti-
tutes by far a better standard than the welfare-based ones in terms of 
administrability and in terms of self-assessment. Such a standard allows avoid-
ing decisions in which an abuse might be characterized only because the down-
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stream competitor would not able to operate as efficiently as the incumbent in 
this segment. In this sense, it prevents decisions that protect the competitor at 
the expense of the consumer. 
Furthermore, such a rallying to a Chicagoan “pro-trust antitrust” convention 
is not definitively achieved. This convention sharply contrasts with the asym-
metrical treatment of the dominant firm in the “integrationist” or “teleological” 
convention. Minimizing the risk of false positive, according to Chicagoan 
recommendations, is supposed to accept a greater proportion of false negative 
decisions, but also to sacrifice the ambition to plan a perfect competition mar-
ket (Salais 2013). The resistance of the teleological convention, hostile to dom-
inant undertakings as soon as they may impair the competition process, must 
not be overlooked. The General Court judgment in Intel, the June 12, 2014 
(case T-286/09, Intel Corp v. Commission), upholding the June 2009 Commis-
sion decision, seems to turn away from the more economic approach and espe-
cially from the as-efficient competitor test, reaffirming the notion the special 
duty of the dominant undertaking and rejecting the necessity to perform an 
assessment of the effects of the practice and by the way banning any procom-
petitive justification for exclusive dealing and loyal rebates schemes.  
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